This paper investigates the problem of secure lossy source coding in the presence of an eavesdropper with arbitrary correlated side informations at the legitimate decoder (referred to as Bob) and the eavesdropper (referred to as Eve). This scenario consists of an encoder that wishes to compress a source to satisfy the desired requirements on: (i) the distortion level at Bob and (ii) the equivocation rate at Eve. It is assumed that the decoders have access to correlated sources as side information. For instance, this problem can be seen as a generalization of the well-known Wyner-Ziv problem taking into account the security requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the problem of compressing correlated sources at sensor nodes in a distributed fashion where the sensors may wish to communicate with each other on a wireless network. Assume also that each of these sensors can have access to a correlated observation to the source or random field of interest. This observation can be used as side information available at the decoder to minimize the distortion between the original source and the estimate at the legitimate decoder (referred to as Bob). In addition to this, we assume that each of the encoders (referred to as Alice) wishes to leak the least possible amount of information about its source to an eavesdropper (referred to as Eve), e.g. an untrusted sensor, who may capture such information during the communication between nodes.
The work of J. Villard is supported by DGA (French Armement Procurement Agency). This research is partially supported by the FP7 Network of Excellence in Wireless COMmunications NEWCOM++.
The above scenario involves many of the major information-theoretic issues on source and channel coding problems. In terms of source coding, Slepian-Wolf [1] and Wyner-Ziv [2] introduced the problem of source coding with side information at the decoder. This topic has been the focus of intense study and some remarkable progress has already been made in theoretical and practical aspects. On the other hand, extensive research has been done during the recent years on secure communications over noisy channels. The traditional focus was on cryptography, based on computational complexity where security only depends on the intractability assumption of NP-complete problems that must be solved prior to decoding. Another approach is the information-theoretic notion of secrecy, introduced by Shannon in [3] , where security is measured through the equivocation rate (i.e. the remaining uncertainty about the message) at the eavesdropper. The wiretap channel was introduced by Wyner [4] , who showed that it is possible to send information at a positive rate with perfect secrecy as long as the channel of the legitimate user is less noisy than the channel of the eavesdropper. Csiszàr-Korner [5] extends this result to the setting of general broadcast channels with any arbitrary equivocation rate. Several extensions of the wiretap and fading channels have been done (cf. [6] , [7] and references therein). So far, very few work has been reported on source coding (or compression) problems with security constraints.
One can identify two approaches in the literature on secure source coding. In fact, it is assumed either that there already exists a secure rate-limited channel between Alice and Bob, which allows the system to use secret keys, or the decoders have access to side information about the source. In the scenario of secret key sharing, both lossless and lossy compression have been studied in various contexts [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] . For the second scenario where side information is available at both decoders, the case of lossless source coding has been recently studied in [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] . Whereas the general lossy source coding problem has not been fully solved, some particular cases can be derived as part of previous work.
It is important to mention here that if the side informations between Bob and Eve are degraded then the result follows as a special case of [18] .
In this paper, we investigate the problem of secure lossy source coding of memoryless sources in the presence of an eavesdropper with different correlated side informations at the decoders of Bob and Eve, as it is shown in Fig. 1 . In this setting the channels between encoder and decoders are assumed to be noiseless so that they cannot provide any advantage to increase security. Our goal is to understand the minimum amount of information that needs to be revealed to Eve to satisfy the distortion constraint at Bob. We provide a complete characterization of the rate-distortion-equivocation region for the case of arbitrary correlated side informations. Several special cases of interest are also considered. As an application example, we consider the case of secure lossy source coding of a binary source, where the side information at Bob (resp. Eve) is the output of a binary erasure channel (resp. a binary symmetric channel) with the source as the input.
This model is of interest since neither Bob nor Eve can always be a lessnoisy decoder.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II states definitions along with the main results, while Section III provides several special cases and discussion. The sketch of the proofs are relegated to Section IV. Finally, Section V presents an application example to binary sources and Section VI summarizes the paper.
Notations
For any sequence (x i ) i∈N * , notation x n k stands for the collection (x k , x k+1 , . . . , x n ). x n 1 is simply denoted by x n . By extension, for any subset J ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, notation x J stands for the collection (x j ) j∈J . The cardinality of an alphabet is denoted by · . For every ǫ > 0, we denote ǫ-typical and conditional ǫ-typical sets by T n ǫ (X) and T n ǫ (Y |x n ), respectively. Following [19] , entropy is denoted by H(·) and mutual information by I(·; ·). Let X, Y and Z be three random variables on some alphabets with probability distribution p. If p(x|y, z) = p(x|y) for each x, y, z, then they form a Markov chain, which is
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND MAIN RESULTS

A. Problem Definition
In this section, we give a more rigorous formulation of the context depicted in Fig. 1 . Let A, B and E be three finite sets. Alice, Bob and Eve observe the sequences of random variables
and (E i ) i∈N * respectively, which take values on A, B and E, resp. For each i ∈ N * , the random variables A i , B i and E i are distributed according to the joint distribution p(a, b, e) on A × B × E. Moreover, they are independent across time i.
An (n, R)-code for source coding in this setup is defined by
• An encoding function at Alice f : A n → {1, . . . , 2 nR }, + is said to be achievable if, for any ǫ > 0, there exists an (n, R + ǫ)-code (f, g) such that:
The set of all achievable tuples is denoted by R * and is referred to as the rate-distortion-equivocation region.
B. Main Result
The proof of the following theorem is given in Sections IV-A and IV-B.
Theorem 1: Region R * is the set of all tuples (R, D, ∆) such that there exist random variables U , V on some finite sets U, V, respectively, and a functionÂ :
form a Markov chain and
The first two inequalities in Theorem 1 are classical in rate-distortion theory. Let us give some intuition on the third one. The first term H(A|V B) corresponds to the equivocation rate at Bob. Alice thus exploits the available distortion at Bob to increase the equivocation rate at Eve. Moreover, for a given random variable V , which determines the rate R and the distortion level D, auxiliary variable U may be tuned to make Bob more capable than Eve i.e., maximize I(A; B|U ) − I(A; E|U ). This quantity represents the gain (or the loss) at Eve in terms of equivocation rate.
The following proposition gives upper bounds on the cardinalities of alphabets U and V. The proof is omitted here and will be provided in an extended version of this paper.
Proposition 1:
In the single-letter characterization of the rate-distortion-equivocation region R * given by Theorem 1, it suffices to consider sets U and V such that U ≤ A +2 and V ≤ ( A +2)( A +1).
III. SPECIAL CASES OF INTEREST
In this section, we derive optimal regions of some special cases of Theorem 1.
A. Lossless Secure Source Coding
The lossless secure source coding problem corresponds to a zero distortion level at Bob (D = 0). In this case, the following corollary, which can also be found in [14] , [15] , directly follows from Theorem 1 such that there exist random variables U ,Â on U and A, respectively, such that U − −Â − − A − − E form a Markov chain and
Note that, as opposed to the secure lossless source coding problem [15] , in our situation, non-zero secrecy is still achievable when Bob has no side information. In fact, Alice can exploit the available distortion at Bob to increase the equivocation rate at Eve.
C. Bob Has Less Noisy Side Information Than Eve
Definition 3: The side information B is less noisy than the side information E if
for each random variable U such that U − − A − − (B, E) form a Markov chain.
Note that the less noisy condition is strictly weaker than the stochastically degraded one.
Corollary 3:
If Bob has less noisy side information than Eve, then region R * reduces to the set of all tuples (R, D, ∆) such that there exist a random variable V on some finite set V, and a function
In this case, random variable U of Theorem 1 is set to a constant value and hence Wyner-Ziv coding [2] achieves the optimal performance.
D. Eve Has Less Noisy Side Information Than Bob
Corollary 4: If Eve has less noisy side information than Bob, then region R * reduces to the set of all tuples (R, D, ∆) such that there exist a random variable V on some finite set V, and a function A : V × B → A such that V − − A − − (B, E) form a Markov chain and
In this case, random variable U of Theorem 1 is set to random variable V and hence Wyner-Ziv coding [2] achieves the optimal performance. Therefore it is not surprising that the equivocation rate at
Eve corresponds to the case where Eve can reliably decode V . Here, Alice can only exploit the available distortion at Bob to achieve a non-zero equivocation rate at Eve.
IV. SKETCH OF PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A. Proof of Achievability
In this section, we prove the achievability part of Theorem 1 i.e., we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 2: Let U , V be random variables on some finite sets U, V, respectively, such that U − −
Proof: Let ǫ > 0 and define
For a sufficiently large n, we build an (n, R + ǫ)-code (f, g) which achieves the required distortion and equivocation rate levels.
1) Codebook generation:
Randomly pick 2 nS1 sequences u n (s 1 ) from T n ǫ (U ) and divide them into 2 nR1 equal size bins {B 1 (r 1 )} r1∈{1,...,2 nR 1 } . Then, for each codeword u n (s 1 ), randomly pick 2 nS2 sequences
) and divide them into 2 nR2 equal size bins {B 2 (s 1 , r 2 )} r2∈{1,...,2 nR 2 } .
2) Encoding:
Assume that sequence A n is produced at Alice. Look for a codeword u n (s 1 ) such that
Let B 1 (r 1 ) and B 2 (s 1 , r 2 ) be the bins of u n (s 1 ) and v n (s 1 , s 2 ), respectively. Alice sends the message f (A n ) (r 1 , r 2 ) on the error-free channel.
3) Decoding:
Assume that Bob receives (r 1 , r 2 ) from Alice and his side information sequence B n .
Now look for the unique codeword
. . , n}.
4) Errors and constraints:
• For n large enough, Pr {(A n , B n ) ∈ T n ǫ (A, B)} < δ.
• In the first encoding step, Alice needs to find (at least) one codeword
, then the probability that this step fails can be upper bounded by δ for a sufficiently large n. Similarly, the second encoding step requires the condition S 2 > I(V ; A|U ) to succeed with a probability higher than 1 − δ.
• In the first decoding step, Bob looks for the unique codeword u
, then the probability that there exists another admissible codeword can be lowered below δ for a large n. Similarly, the second decoding step requires the condition S 2 − R 2 < I(V ; B|U ) to succeed with a probability higher than 1 − δ.
Defining the global transmitted rate R + ǫ = R 1 + R 2 and putting all inequalities together, we prove that a sufficient condition for the above code to work with an error probability lower than 5δ is given by: 
5) Distortion at Bob:
Denote by F the event "An error occurred during the encoding or decoding steps." We now check that our code achieves the required distortion level at Bob:
6) Equivocation Rate at Eve:
The equivocation rate at Eve can be lower bounded as follows:
If R 2 > I(V ; A|U ) − I(V ; B|U ), the equivocation rate can thus be bounded as follows:
where the last inequality follows after some straightforward derivation from the definition of δ and the
Thus, each ∆ ≤ H(A|U E) − R 2 is achievable. The above constraint on R 2 together with the latter inequality yield the given sufficient condition.
Note that our coding scheme can be interpreted as a simple binning operation to transmit U , followed by a Wyner-Ziv coding [2] to transmit A with side information (U, B) at Bob.
B. Proof of Converse
In this section, we prove the converse part of Theorem 1 i.e., we prove the following proposition: Proof: Let ǫ > 0. There exists an (n, R + ǫ)-code (f, g) s.t.:
Denote by W = f (A n ) the transmitted message. The following Markov chain holds for each subset J ⊂ {1, . . . , n}:
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, define U i and V i such that
From Equation (1),
1) Rate:
• step (b) from the non-negativity of mutual information,
• step (c) from the chain rule for conditional mutual information,
• step (d) from the independence of the random variables A, B and E across time,
• step (e) from the non-negativity of mutual information and Equation (3).
Following the usual technique, we now define an independent random variable Q uniformly distributed over the set {1, . . . , n}, and
still form a Markov chain and (A, B, E) is distributed according to the joint distribution p(a, b, e) i.e., the original distribution of (A i , B i , E i ). Then
2) Distortion at Bob: Bob reconstructs g(W, B n ). The i-th coordinate of this estimate writes
The component-wise mean distortion at Bob is:
where we defined functionÂ on V × B bŷ
Consequently,
3) Equivocation Rate at Eve:
where
• step (a) follows from the Markov chain W − − A n − − (B n , E n ),
• step (b) from the chain rules for conditional entropy and mutual information, and the fact that random variables A i , B i and E i are independent across time,
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• step (d) from the definitions of random variables U i and V i (Equations (2) and (3), resp.),
• step (e) from the Markov chain
Now, using auxiliary random variable Q defined above,
This proves Proposition 3.
V. APPLICATION EXAMPLE: CODING BINARY SOURCE WITH BEC AND BSC SIDE INFORMATIONS
Consider the source model depicted in Fig. 2 where the source is binary and the side informations at Observe that this model is of interest since neither Bob nor Eve can always be a lessnoisy decoder
for all values of (p, ǫ). Thus in general U is neither constant nor equal to V . We also remark that
Corollary 3 provides the rate-distortion-equivocation region when ǫ lies in regions (a) or (b). Otherwise, only Theorem 1 applies for the general case.
From now on, let the distortion function at Bob d be the Hamming distance and assume for simplicity that the source is uniform distributed, i.e., Pr {A = 0} = Pr {A = 1} = 1/2. We know from the cardinality constraints given in Proposition 1 that it suffices to consider sets U and V such that U ≤ 4 and V ≤ 12.
Moreover, from the following proposition, we can restrict our attention to the auxiliary variables (U, V )
obtained as the outputs of a degraded binary symmetric broadcast channel with input A, as it is depicted in Fig. 4 . Notice that V is identical to the auxiliary variable used by Wyner and Ziv [2] for the rate-distortion function of a binary source in the case where there is no eavesdropper.
Proposition 4:
In the case considered in this section, and depicted in Fig. 2 , region R * is the set of all
Proof: The achievability part of Proposition 4 is a direct application of Theorem 1: define auxiliary random variables U and V as depicted in Fig. 4 , and functionÂ on V byÂ(v) = v. Expressions of Proposition 4 follow after some straightforward derivations.
The converse part needs more arguments. The proof is omitted here and will be provided in an extended version of this paper. We now numerically compute some achievable values for p = 0.1 and ε = h 2 (p) = 0.469 (see Fig. 5 ).
In the case of lossless compression (columns #1 and #2 of Table I), the auxiliary random variable V is set to be A i.e., α = 0. The additional variable U actually enables a non-zero equivocation level, as noted in [15] . Assume that the coding rate is limited to a maximum of 80% of the required rate for perfect reconstruction of the source (column #3). This induces a distortion of 1.5% at Bob and then an equivocation rate of 0.126 bits at Eve is achievable. This means that even a small increase in the distortion at Bob can be fully exploited by Alice to achieve very significant gains (more than third times in this case) in terms of equivocation rate at Eve. Moreover, in the situation considered in this paragraph, Wyner-Ziv coding actually achieves the optimal performance for distortion levels higher than 0.036 as shown in Fig. 5 
VI. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS
The problem of secure lossy source coding of memoryless sources in the presence of an eavesdropper with different correlated side informations at the legitimate decoder (Bob) and the eavesdropper (Eve) was investigated. A complete characterization of the rate-distortion-equivocation region was derived for An application example to secure lossy source coding of a binary source, where the side information at Bob (resp. Eve) is the output of a binary erasure channel (resp. a binary symmetric channel) with the source as the input, was considered. This model is of interest since neither Bob nor Eve can always be a lessnoisy decoder and thus the encoding strategy needed to achieve the optimal equivocation rate is rather tricky. In the case where the source is uniformly distributed, we proved that it is optimal to consider binary auxiliary random variables and provided corresponding expressions for the rate-distortion-equivocation region.
As future and on-going work, it would be of interest to extend the results in the present work to the more general setting in which the encoder wishes to maximize not only the equivocation rate, but also an arbitrary measure of the equivocation distortion at the eavesdropper.
